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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal stems from Irvine Hodge's judgment and 
conviction entered on March 10, 1999, finding him guilty of 
violating federal law for "affect[ing] commerce" by robbery 
and for possession of a firearm during the commission of a 
 
crime of violence, as well as finding him guilty for robbery 
in the first degree in violation of Virgin Islands law. In 
affirming Hodge's conviction and sentence, we hold that a 
failure to include the element of specific intent in Hodge's 
robbery indictment was not reversible error; that Hodge was 
 
properly convicted of aiding and abetting even though the 
principal offender was never charged; and that although the 
United States and the Virgin Islands are considered one 
sovereign for purposes of convictions and sentencing, 
because the charged federal and Virgin Islands offenses 
require proofs of elements independent of each other. 
Hodge was properly convicted and sentenced on both 
counts without violating the double jeopardy clause of the 
United States Constitution.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court properly exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 48 
U.S.C. S 1612 and 4 V.I.C. S 32; we exercise appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 as an appeal from a final order. 
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I. 
 
Two males robbed the Emerald Lady jewelry store in St. 
Thomas after it had closed on November 15, 1995. 2 By 
gunpoint, the robbers ordered the owners to lie on the floor 
while they stole more than 500 pieces of jewelry, valued at 
approximately $500,000, from a safe. Hodge was arrested 
for the robbery in March of 1996.3 A federal grand jury 
indicted Hodge on a three count indictment for interference 
with commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1951-52 ("Count 
I"); possession of a firearm during the commission of a 
crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1) 
("Count II"); and robbery in the first degree in violation of 
14 V.I.C. S 1862(2) ("Count III"). 
 
On September 16, 1998, the jury returned a guilty 
verdict with respect to all three counts of the indictment. 
On October 5, 1998, the district court denied Hodge's 
motion for judgment of acquittal, which, because of the 
content of the motion, the court analyzed as a motion to 
seek arrest of the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 34. With an offense level of twenty-nine 
and a criminal history category of I, the District Court 
sentenced Hodge on February 17, 1999, to a term of 108 
months imprisonment on Count I; a mandatory consecutive 
term of sixty months imprisonment on Count II; and 
thirteen years imprisonment on Count III to be served 
concurrently with the sentences imposed in Counts I and II.4 
The District Court also imposed three years of supervised 
release, assessed Hodge $100, and ordered him to pay 
$20,000 in restitution. This appeal ensued. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. From the record we are unable to determine the fate of Derek George, 
the second individual involved in this robbery. All we can gather is that 
George testified at Hodge's trial to their joint involvement in the 
robbery 
of the Emerald Lady (App. A71-A111), and that George was testifying 
pursuant to the terms of a February 24, 1997, agreement with the 
government -- the terms of which we are unaware. Id. at A79-A81. 
 
3. Although Hodge was a juvenile (17) at the time of his arrest, he was 
transferred to adult status on March 31, 1998. 
 
4. The court credited Hodge for the time he served since May 29, 1998. 
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II. 
 
In the first issue raised by this appeal, Hodge contends 
that because his indictment on Count III -- robbery in 
violation of 14 V.I.C. S 1862 -- failed to allege the material 
element of specific intent, his conviction should have been 
dismissed. Hodge cites to a prior decision of this Court in 
which, as a preliminary matter, we held that specific intent 
to permanently deprive the rightful owner of the property 
taken is an element of the Virgin Islands robbery statute. 
See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Carmona, 422 F.2d 
95, 98 (3d Cir. 1970). Although Carmona required only that 
this element of specific intent be included in the jury 
charge, Hodge argues that the failure to include this 
element in his indictment as well constitutes reversible 
error. 
 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
requires that in criminal prosecutions, "the accused shall 
enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation." To meet this requirement, Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 7(c)(1) requires that an indictment be a 
"plain, concise and definite written statement of the 
essential facts constituting the offense charged." We 
consider a two part test to measure the sufficiency of an 
indictment: "(1) whether the indictment `contains the 
elements of the offense intended to be charged and 
sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be 
prepared to meet,' and (2) enables the defendant to plead 
an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for 
the same offense." Government of the Virgin Islands v. 
Moolenaar, 133 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting 
Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962)). "The 
sufficiency of an information, like the sufficiency of an 
indictment, presents a question of law over which our 
review is plenary." Government of the Virgin Islands v. 
Moolenaar, 133 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
In evaluating whether Hodge's indictment sufficiently sets 
forth the essential facts of the offense charged, we review 
the indictment using a common sense construction. See id. 
at 250. Under Virgin Islands law, robbery is defined as: "the 
unlawful taking of personal property in the possession of 
another, from his person or immediate presence and 
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against his will, by means of force or fear." 14 V.I.C. S 1861. 
In this case, the indictment was sufficient to apprise Hodge 
of the robbery charged and to enable him to avoid 
subsequent prosecution for the same offense, even though 
it did not explicitly recite the element of specific intent. The 
indictment stated that: 
 
       On or about the 15th day of November 1995, at St. 
       Thomas, in the District of the Virgin Islands, Irvine 
       Hodge, Jr. did unlawfully take personal property, that 
       is, jewelry, in the possession of the owners of the 
       Emerald Lady Jewelry Store, from their persons and 
       immediate presence and against their will, by means of 
       force and fear, and in the course of the commission of 
       such robbery and of immediate flight therefrom, did 
       display, use and threaten the use of a dangerous 
       weapon, that is, a handgun; 
 
        In violation of Title 14, Virgin Islands Code, Sections 
       1862(2) and 11. 
 
App. at A11. 
 
As the district court stated in its memorandum 
addressing Hodge's post-trial motion, "Hodge's indictment 
tracks the definition of first degree robbery employed by the 
Virgin Islands Code, which does not expressly include the 
element of specific intent." Id. at A39. Moreover, even 
though Carmona has held that specific intent is an element 
of the Virgin Islands robbery statute, this Court has stated 
that: "[f]ailure to allege the statutory elements will not be 
fatal provided that alternative language is used or that the 
essential elements are charged in the indictment by 
necessary implication." Moolenaar, 133 F.3d at 249 
(approvingly quoting 24 Moore's Federal Practice 
S 607.04[2][b][ii] (3d ed. 1997)). We agree with the District 
Court that Hodge's indictment was sufficient to meet all of 
the requirements of Rule 7(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, and hence we reject Hodge's argument 
that his indictment was flawed. 
 
The Carmona case, upon which Hodge erroneously relies 
to support his contention that his indictment failed to 
include the necessary element of intent, is inapposite. 
Carmona merely required that when a defendant is accused 
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of robbery under Virgin Islands law, the element of specific 
intent must be recited in the jury charge. See Carmona, 422 
F.2d at 99. As required under Carmona, the District Court 
properly included this element of specific intent in its 
charge to the jury. Jury charge 36 stated: "[t]he government 
must prove . . . that the defendant, Irvine Hodge, Jr., 
unlawfully took personal property with the specific intent to 
permanently deprive the owner of it." App. at A33 
(emphasis added). 
 
We will therefore affirm Hodge's conviction with respect to 
Count III. 
 
III. 
 
In the second issue raised by this appeal, Hodge 
contends that he cannot be convicted for aiding and 
abetting a principal in the commission of a crime if the 
principal is either acquitted or not charged. Despite Hodge's 
argument, it is beyond dispute that a person charged with 
aiding and abetting a crime can be convicted regardless of 
the fate of the principal. See 18 U.S.C.S 2. The federal 
statute clearly states that: "[w]hoever commits an offense 
against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, 
commands, induces or procures its commission, is 
punishable as a principal." 18 U.S.C. S 2. The Virgin 
Islands statute is in accord, stating that "[w]hoever commits 
a crime or offense or aids, abets, counsels, commands, 
induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a 
principal." 14 V.I.C. S 11. We have also held the same, 
stating that: "18 U.S.C. S 2, the majority of cases, and the 
Model Penal Code, all take the view that an aider and 
abettor should be treated like any other principal, and be 
required to `stand on his own two feet.' " See e.g., United 
States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076, 1090 (3d Cir. 1979), 
aff 'd. 447 U.S. 10, 15-20 (1980) (so holding, even when the 
principal is charged and acquitted). Hence, we reject 
Hodge's argument to the contrary. 
 
IV. 
 
Finally, Hodge argues that convicting him on both 
Counts I and III violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
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United States Constitution. Hodge correctly notes that "the 
Virgin Islands and the federal government are considered 
one sovereignty for the purpose of determining whether an 
individual may be punished under both Virgin Islands and 
United States statutes for a similar offense growing out of 
the same occurrence." Government of the Virgin Islands v. 
Brathwaite, 782 F.2d 399, 406 (3d Cir. 1986). See also 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 633 F.2d 660, 
669 (3d Cir. 1980); Government of the Virgin Islands v. 
Foster, 734 F. Supp. 210, 212 (D.Ct. V.I. 1990) (holding 
that when a defendant is charged with a violation of federal 
law and the "second criminal code is that of a Territory, 
instead of a State, the Double Jeopardy Clause is violated 
by the imposition of more than one sentence for the`same 
offense.' " (citations omitted)). 
 
If the two offenses grow out of the same occurrence then 
"multiple punishments are impermissible." Brathwaite, 782 
F.2d 406. To determine whether the offenses grow out of 
the same occurrence, we apply the test set forth in 
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). See, e.g., 
Brathwaite, 782 F.2d at 406-07; United States v. Blyden, 
930 F.2d 323, 328 (3d Cir. 1991). The Blockburger test 
considers whether the provisions of each statute require 
proof of a fact that the other does not. See Blockburger, 284 
U.S. at 304 ("A single act may be an offense against two 
statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an additional 
fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction 
under either statute does not exempt the defendant from 
prosecution and punishment under the other." (citation 
omitted)). 
 
In this case 18 U.S.C. S 1951 (Count I) states that: 
 
       [w]hoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or 
       affects commerce or the movement of any article or 
       commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or 
       attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens 
       physical violence to any person or property in 
       furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in 
       violation of this section [shall be liable]. 
 
Among its various elements, this federal charge requires 
that Hodge's offense "affect commerce" as an element of the 
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crime. By contrast, the Virgin Islands crime of robbery, 14 
V.I.C. S 1862 (Count III), states that: "[a] person is guilty of 
robbery in the first degree when, in the course of the 
commission of the crime or the immediate flight therefrom, 
he or another perpetrator of the crime . . . (2) displays, uses 
or threatens the use of a dangerous weapon." This latter 
charge under the laws of the Virgin Islands requires, as an 
element of the crime, proof that Hodge displayed, used or 
threatened to use a dangerous weapon, and does not 
implicate an "affect [on] commerce" as does the federal 
offense. 
 
Thus, Count I and Count III do not "grow out of the same 
occurrence" as each requires proof of an additional element 
not required by the other. Therefore, under the Blockburger 
test, the court could properly convict and sentence Hodge 
under both United States and Virgin Islands law without 
violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. We will, therefore, 
affirm Hodge's conviction and sentence on both Counts I 
and III. 
 
V. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Hodge's 
conviction and sentence on Counts I, II and III of the 
indictment.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Subsequent to oral argument, the government of the Virgin Islands, 
which is not a party to this case, filed an Attorney General's amicus 
brief 
urging us to overrule Government of the Virgin Islands v. Carmona, 422 
F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1970) in that it wrongly held that the Virgin Islands 
robbery statute includes the element of specific intent. The Attorney 
General argued that the legislative history surrounding the 1957 
statutory amendment to the Virgin Islands robbery statute indicates that 
the legislature intended to eliminate the element of specific intent from 
the statute. Although we may be persuaded by the Attorney General's 
excellent amicus brief, we acknowledge that we are powerless to redress 
this concern. Rule 9.1 of our Internal Operating Procedures does not 
permit one panel of this court to overrule a holding of a prior published 
opinion. Carmona may only be overruled by an en banc decision of this 
entire court or by a decision of the Supreme Court. Of course, the Virgin 
Islands legislature remains free to remove any confusion stemming from 
the interpretation of its robbery statute by enacting appropriate 
legislation to redress the problem. 
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